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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
(exclusive of Sundays) which the plaintiff's company might give in
New York, it was not possible for her to perform elsewhere in New
York without a violation of her contract with the plaintiff, and a
negative clause was unnecessary to secure to the plaintiff exclusively
the services of the defendant." In Hoyt v. Fuller2D where the
services performed by the defendant were special, unique, and extra-
ordinary, in that she had invented an attractive specialty known as
the "Serpentine Dance" and through which act she had gained a
great reputation, the court again dispensed with the necessity of an
express negative covenant. Based on the contract for services, to
run "not exceeding August 1, 1892," the court granted an injunction
prohibiting other appearances. "The contract was intended to give
the plaintiffs, not the divided, but the exclusive, services of the
defendant, and where that is apparent a negative clause is unnecessary
to secure the result."
. Clearly, the court recognized a right arising out of the contract
in these cases. But the agreement must be certain and definite as to
the obligations imposed on the other party to the contract, before the
court should imply an obligation by injunction.30 However, when the
contract is conscionable, a right arises from the defendant's positive
covenant; and, though in England the stricter rule prevails, in New
York if there is the possibility of enforcing this right in personam by
injunction, our courts will decree one.
LAWRENCE T. GREssER, JR.
CORPORATIONS-JURISDIC.TION-INTERFERENCE WITHE THE
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF A CORPORATION.
Despite the fact that Section 224 of the General Corporation
Law provides that an action against a foreign corporation may be
' 19 N. Y. Supp. 962 (1892).
'Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N. Y. 490, 135 N. E. 861 (1922). "What equity
exacts today as a condition of relief is the assurance that the decree, if ren-
dered, will operate without injustice or oppression either to plaintiff or to
defendant"; Lawrence v. Dixey, 104 N. Y. Supp. 516 (1907), where there was
no positive arrangement between the parties as to the subsequent seasons, or the
salary of the defendant, the court considered an injunction inequitable. "But
whether or not a court of equity will grant equitable relief in an action of this
character is always addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and could
never be enforced unless the parties seeking to enforce it are specifically bound
by the contract, so that there are enforceable reciprocal obligations, which are
definite and enforceable; Harry Hastings Attractions v. Howard, 119 Misc.
Rep. 326, 196 N. Y. Supp. 228 (1922), where the defendant took the leading
role in a burlesque performance, and his ability was such that his services were
unique, special, and extraordinary, he was enjoined from performing for any
person other than the plaintiff during the term of his contract. "The situation
here warrants the intervention of the court."
NOTES AND COMMENT
maintained by a resident of this state, or by a domestic corporation,
for any cause of action,' Judge Cardozo once said that: "To trace
in advance the precise line of demarcation between the controversies
affecting a foreign corporation in which jurisdiction will be assumed
and those in which jurisdiction will be declined, would be a difficult
and hazardous venture." la
In a recent New York case 2 an action was brought by the plain-
tiffs against the defendant, a foreign (Indiana) corporation. The
relief prayed for in the complaint was for a judgment on behalf of
the plaintiffs and similar stockholders that the defendant be directed
to redeem shares of its stock at par value with accumulated interest
or in the alternative to declare a dividend out of the surplus of the
defendant corporation at an equitable rate. To entitle the plaintiffs
to this relief, the complaint alleged that the defendant operated
stores and transacted business in a number of cities in the states of
Indiana and Michigan; that the plaintiff acquired by assignment
twenty shares of the preferred stock of the defendant corporation
on or about the 7th day of January, 1921, which were duly trans-
ferred on the books of the defendant, and that a new certificate was
issued to the plaintiffs; that the stock was "redeemable in any event
by said company within ten years after date at par value and ac-
cumulated interest"; that no dividends have been declared by the
defendant notwithstanding the fact that financial reports have shown
the defendant to have an average surplus of $100,000 and that the
average net profit of the defendant is $100,000 per annum; that
the directors of the defendant corporation "have refused and in bad
faith neglected to comply with the demand of the plaintiffs that
dividends be declared or that the stock be redeemed," and that the
plaintiffs have no remedy at law. Held, that the courts of this state
will not assume jurisdiction, in ordinary cases, to regulate the in-
ternal affairs of a foreign corporation.3 The opinion also stated
that consideration of convenience, of efficiency and of justice 4 points
to the courts of Indiana as the appropriate tribunals to regulate the
internal affairs of the defendant corporation.
It would appear that in this case the Court refused to attempt
to decide how a foreign corporation should obey the laws of the
state or county under which it exists. There are other decisions by
'New York Gen. Corp. Law, §224, L. 1909, c. 28.
,a Travis v. Knox Terpezone Co., infra note 3 at 264, 109 N. E. 250.
2 Cohn and Tubow v. Mishkoff Costello Co., 256 N. Y. 102, 175 N. E.
529 (1931).
UMarshold v. Sherman, 148 N. Y. 9, 42 N. E. 419 (1896) ; Southworth v.
Morgan, 205 N. Y. 293, 98 N. E. 490 (1912) ; Muck v. Hitchcock, 212 N. Y.
283, 106 N. E. 75 (1914); Travis v. Knox Terpezone Co., 215 N. Y. 259, 109
N. E. 250 (1915) ; People v. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators, et al., 218
N. Y. 115, 112 N. E. 752 (1916); Tompkins Loring v. Schwartz, 249 N. Y. 206,
163 N. E. 735 (1928); Butler v. Standard Milk Flour Co., 146 App. Div. 735,
131 N. Y. Supp. 451 (1st Dept. 1911).
'See Plimpton v. Bigelow, 93 N. Y. 592, 602 (1883).
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the New York courts to the effect that special remedies provided
by foreign laws must be applied by the courts of the state wherein
the corporation is domiciled. 5
In an earlier New York case,6 the plaintiffs were stockholders
in a foreign corporation. Subsequent to their becoming stockholders,
one of the individual defendants became the owner through himself
and his associates of a majority of the stock of the corporation and
caused himself 'and his associates to be elected directors. The direc-
tors then passed a resolution to increase the capital stock of the
corporation from $50,000 to $100,000 and issued the increased stock
without consideration. Later the defendant directors caused the
corporation to execute a mortgage of $100,000 and announced their
intention to issue bonds secured by that mortgage to said amount.
The plaintiff claimed that the capital stock of the corporation was
$50,000 and that it had no power to mortgage the property to a
greater amount and sued to compel cancellation of the stocks and
bonds and to have the capital stock declared as $50,000. The Court
held for the defendant and stated in part:
"* * * If this were an action simply to compel an ac-
counting and restoration, by parties within the jurisdiction,
of property taken or withheld, and to restore it, even to a
foreign corporation, the power of the court to entertain juris-
diction could not be questioned. * * * This action gives a
court of equity jurisdiction of the subject matter whenever
it can obtain jurisdiction of the persons of the defendants,
* * * even though the subject matter is outside the state."
This indicates to some extent that one test of whether or not the
Courts will declare jurisdiction is the ability to enforce the decree
and not whether or not it involves interference with the internal
management of a foreign corporation.
In another New York case7 an action was brought against a
foreign (Connecticut) life insurance company by a resident member
of the company, holding one of its certificates, to restrain the com-
pany from making an assessment against him of more than a cer-
tain amount named in the member's certificate. The Court held that
to compel the company to account for monies paid by it in excess
of the amount stated in the certificate relates to the internal affairs
of the company, and its method of assessment against members for
the various purposes for which they are liable is governed by local
laws and regulations and should be adjusted in an action brought
'Christenson v. Eno, 106 N. Y. 97, 12 N. E. 648 (1887); Lowry v. Inman,
46 N. Y. 119 (1876).
aMiller v. Quincy, 179 N. Y. 294, 72 N. E. 116 (1904) ; Ernst v. Ruther-
ford and B. S. Gas Co., 38 App. Div. 388, 56 N. Y. Supp. 403 (2nd Dept. 1899).
Sauerbrunn v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 220 N. Y. 363, 115 N. E. 1001,
1004 (1917).
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in the home state of the company. The Court also held that when
a company, its officers and accounts, are without the state and the
order and decree of the Courts of this state could not be enforced
against the corporation without its consent, the jurisdiction of the
Court over the defendant acquired by its appearance in the action,
does not necessarily extend to the subject matter.
The Court in its opinion quoted dicta from a Massachusetts
case 8 to the effect that:
"Rights of third parties, whether they happen to be
stockholders or not, if the rights are such as are recognized
by our laws, may be enforced by our courts, unless they re-
late to such internal affairs of the corporation as ought to
be regulated only by the courts of the state or county to
which it owes its existence."
The Court went on to say:
"That our courts might entertain jurisdiction of an ac-
tion brought against defendant to recover for the death of a
member and in such action to determine whether or not the
policy was in force, the validity of an assessment made for
non-payment of which forfeiture was claimed, cannot be ques-
tioned. Such an action does not correspond to the action at
bar wherein the court is invoked to exercise visitorial powers
to review and decree how the acts of a corporation which
derives its authority from the law of another state shall ex-
ercise such power."
The Court then proceeds to explain why the law of the state under
which the corporation exists should govern:
"We may assume that the membership of the defendant
corporation extends throughout a number of states, and while
it may be said that the present action affects the plaintiff alone,
we cannot overlook the fact that if the various states assumejurisdiction in like actions the decisions of the courts may be
divergent, different rules of law would prevail and a cor-
poration might be called upon to account in various states and
relieved therefrom by the decrees of courts in other states.
Likewise it might be held legal for it to increase assessments
in certain jurisdictions and illegal to increase and collect the
same in other jurisdictions. Uniformity of decision is
preferable." sa
'Andrews v. Mines Corporation, 205 Mass. 121, 123, 91 N. E. 122, 123
(1910), as quoted by Cardozo, J. in Travis v. Knox Terpezone Co., supra note
3, at 371, 109 N. E. at 251.
'a Supra note 7 at 372, 109 N. E. at 251.
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Probably the best known case 9 involved the right of a resident
stockholder in a foreign (New Jersey) corporation to maintain an
action to compel the foreign corporation to register the transfer of
stock and to issue new certificates. The plaintiff was the owner by
assignment of transferable certificates. The stocks were surren-
dered to the proper corporation official who had offices in New York,
but the corporation refused to make the transfer or to return the
certificates. The Court maintained that the plaintiff had two rem-
edies: a suit in either trover or assumpsit on the grounds of conver-
sion, or a suit in specific performance. The defendants were subject
to the process of the New York Courts because they bad appro-
priated shares of stock which belong to a resident of New York
and the New York Courts will protect his ownership.
In another New York case 10 the Court again compelled the
transfer of shares on corporate books and the delivery of certificates.
In this case the Court refused, however, to annul the election of
directors by the stockholders of the corporation which the plaintiff
alleged was illegal because he had been unable to vote his stock due
to its not having been transferred on the books of the corporation.
The defendant claimed as a defense that the New York Courts
had no jurisdiction because stockholders were members of the cor-
poration, and to compel a transfer of stock would cause the plaintiff
to be admitted as a member which would involve the internal man-
agement of the corporation.' But the Court held that the transfer
of stock was a contractual obligation that could be enforced and not
interference with the internal management of a foreign corporation.
It would appear, therefore, that even though interference with
the internal affairs of a foreign corporation is involved, the Courts
of this state will assume jurisdiction,'12 when:
1. Jurisdiction can be obtained of the person or thing in
respect to which the jurisdiction is to be exercised.'3
9 Travis v. Knox Terpezone Co., supra note 3; Guilford v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 59 Minn. 332, 61 N. W. 324 (1894) ; West Nat. Bank v. New England
Electric, 73 N. H. 465, 62 Atl. 971 (1893).
" Butler v. Standard Milk Flour Co., supra note 3.
' People v. Brotherhood of Painters and Decorators, et al., supra note 3.
'Note (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 968, 977: "* * * it seems that the rule of
non-interference with the internal affairs of a foreign corporation developed as a
result of a desire by courts of equity, for reasons of comity, not to supervise or
regulate the legal creation of another jurisdiction. However, due to the growth
of a practice of organizing a corporation in a state where little or no actual
business was done, there has been a tendency to narrow the scope of the rule.
And most courts will no longer refuse to entertain jurisdiction of suits against
a foreign corporation unless it appears that the courts of domicile can more
properly effectuate relief between the litigants."
' Guilford v. Western Union Tel. Co., supra note 9; Travis v. Knox
Terpezone Co., supra note 3; Plimpton v. Bigelow, supra note 4; Butler v.
Standard Milk Flour Co., supra note 10.
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2. The decree of the Court could be enforced with con-
venience, efficiency, and justice.1 4
3. Special remedies provided by the laws of the state or
county to which the foreign corporation owes its exist-
ence are not involved.15
4. There would be no attempt to adjudicate the power given
to the foreign corporation by the state to which it owes
its existence.10
HARRY F. SCHROEDER.
EVIDENCE-PRSUMPTIONS-PREJMPTION OF SUICIDE-
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.
The force of dicta as judicial authority is irregular and uncer-
tain. Sometimes it has almost the binding authority of settled law;
again it will be referred to only to be distinguished.' The weight
given to it is determined in part by the court which issued it, the
personal eminence of the justices in that court, and the force and
certainty of the rule to which it relates.
In People v. Miller2 the New York Court of Appeals, speak-
ing through its Chief judge, expressed dissatisfaction with, and
an intention to abandon, a rule of the law of evidence, which this
same Court, not ten years prior thereto,3 had found occasion to
acknowledge and affirm. While it is true that this expression of
disapprobation was unnecessary to the decision, and hence only
dictum, there are, we think, few students of the law who would
not view this case as overruling the former decision. Assuming
therefore, if we may, that this is true, it behooves us to examine
the rule of law which the Court has seen fit to repudiate.
In People v. Creasy4 the defendant was tried for the murder
of his fiance; the defense was suicide. The facts were such that
only one of two possibilities could have occurred. Either he mur-
dered her or she committed suicide. The jury was instructed as
', Supra note 2.
'Supra note 5.
" Supra note 7.
5 Amer. & Eng. Cyc. of Law 661; 15 C. J. 950, §344; Rush v. French,
1 Ariz. 991, 25 Pac. 815 (1874).
"257 N. Y. 54, 177 N. E. 306 (1931).
'People v. Creasy, 236 N. Y. 205, 140 N. E. 563 (1923). It will be noted
that of the seven judges then sitting, three are on the court which decided
People v. Miller, viz. Cardozo, Pound and Crane, JU. Since Pound and Crane
dissented, and voted to affirm the conviction, only the present chief judge can
be construed to have assented to that holding.
'Ibid.
